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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UT'AH

JENSEN'S USED CARS,
Respondent,

Case
No. 8741

-vs.-

JAMES T. RICE,
.A.ppellwnt.

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some time prior to August 12, 1955, the Defendant
and Appellant, James T. Rice ordered a 1955 Ford Mainline automobile from Plaintiff and Respondent. When
said automobile was delivered to Appellant by Respondent's agent on either the 12th or 13th day of August, 1955,
Appellant gave Respondent's agent a check in the amount
of $200.00, dated August 13, 1955, drawn on the Valley
State Bank and made payable to the Respondent, Jensen's
Used Cars. Said check was a down payment on said auto1
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mobile, the balance of the purchase price to be subsequently arranged for and paid to Respondent by Appellant. Then on August 18, 1955, Appellant went to the
First National Bank of Murray, Utah, where financing
had been arranged for, and executed a promissory note
and conditional sale contract on said automobile payable
to Respondent Jensen's Used Cars at the First National
Bank of Murray. (See Ex. 2 and 3) The contract and
note were fully prepared and completed at the time they
were signed and delivered by Appellant and provided for
payment of a balance in the sum of TWO THOUSAND
FORTY-FIVE AND 70/100 ($2,045.70) DOLLARS in installments of not less than $68.19 per month beginning
October 2, 1955. The contract provided for an unpaid cash
price balance of $1,650.00 plus time-price differential and
other charges, bringing the time balance to $2,045. 70.
Appellant retained possession of the automobile until November 9, 1955, some three months after its purchase,
when it was repossessed by an agent of the First National
Bank of Murray due to the failure of Appellant to pay the
installments provided for in the promissory note. No
payments have ever been made by Appellant on the note
and he stopped payment on the $200.00 down-payment
check, according to his ow11 testimony (R. p. 68) and has
never paid the check or any part thereof. In fact, there
were not sufficient funds on deposit in Appellant's account
at Valley State Bank to haYe paid said check at the time
it was presented or for some five or six "'"eeks thereafter,
even if payment had not been stopped. (R., bottom p. 29
and top of p. 25)
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The repossessed automobile vvas re-sold by Respondent for $1,180.00 and this action was brought by Respondent to recover the deficiency of $965.70 on said note, plus
interest, and to recover the amount of the $200.00 check
given as a down payment. The Court directed a verdict in
favor of Respondent for the amount of the deficiency on
the note and submitted the issue as to the $200.00 check
and the attorney's fees to the jury. The jury found the
issues in favor of Respondent on the $200.00 check and
a·\Yarded Respondent $175.00 attorney's fees. Defendant
appeals and asks that the judgment be reversed or that
the cause be remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I.

THE PROMISSORY NOTE IN SUIT SPEAKS
FOR ITSELF, BEING UNAMBIGUOUS AND
CLEAR AND REGULAR ON ITS FAC'E, AND
HAVING BEEN SUPPORTED BY VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE FORM OF AN AUTOMOBILE IT' C'ANNOT BE ALTERED OR VARIED
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
PoiNT

II.

THERE WAS NO LACK OF MEETING OF THE
MINDS WITH RESPECT T'O THE PROMISSORY
NOTE OR CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT.
PoiNT

III.

THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF F'ACT TO BE
3
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SUBMITrED TO THE JURY REGARDING THE
FOLLOWING:
(a) THE ACTUAL EXECUTION AND CON-

SUMMATION
CONTRACT.

OF

THE

NOTE

AND

(b) THE QUESTION OF FAILURE OF GO·NSIDERATION.

PoiNT

IV.

IF THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE. JURY AFTER ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL,
SUCH ERROR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED BY STIPULATION AND ACQUIESCENC'E OF DEFENDANT
AND COUNSEL.

PoiNT

V.

THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADMIT
EXHIBITS 8 AND 9 WAS NOT IN ERROR AND
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

PoiNT

VI.

THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAlNT FOR FAILURE· TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION.
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ARGUMENT
It is apparent that a great quantity of extraneous
matter has been injected into this case, both at the trial
and in Appellant's Brief.

PoiNT

I.

THE PR.OMISS.OR.Y NOTE IN SUIT SP'EAKS
FOR ITSELF, BEING UNAMBIGUOUS AND
CLEAR AND REGULAR ON ITS FACE, AND
HAVING BEEN SUPPORTED BY VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE FORM OF AN AUTO..,
MOBILE IT c·ANNOT BE ALTERED OR VARIED
BY EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
To begin with, this case concerns principally the Appellant's liability on the promissory note given as evidence of debt for the purchase of an automobile. The cardinal rule of construction of any written contract is to
ascertain the intention of the parties. To ascertain this
intention, resort is first had to the language of the instrument; if such language appears to be perfectly plain and
capable of a legal construction, then the force and effect to
be given to the contract must be determined by its terms
and a different construction from that imported by its
terms cannot be obtained by the use of extrinsic evidence.
(See 7 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes, Sec. 49, P. 815) The
parol evidence rule, long regarded as a rule of evidence,
has now come to be regarded rather as a rule of substantive law. In addition to the fact that the clear, complete and unambiguous note speaks for itself, the Appellant's own testimony at the trial shows a clear intention at
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the time of the signing of the note to bind himself for the
payment of the face amount of the note by the installments and according to the terms provided for therein.
(R., p. 92)
PorNT

II.

THERE WAS NO LACK OF MEETING OF THE
MINDS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROMISSORY
NOTE OR CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT.
There can be no question as to the lack of a meeting
of the minds in the execution of the contract because of
any dispute as to the total purchase price of the automobile, since Appellant had already, the day before the
execution of the note, stopped payment on the $200.00
down-payment check, thus preventing Respondent from
obtaining payment of the $200.00, and with full knowledge
of this fact signed a note for an amount less than the
amount "\vhich he admits was the agreed price of the car,
and \vhich price he admitted at the trial he intended to
pay. (R.. , p. 70) At that point he could have elected not
to sign the note and contract and returned the automobile to Respondent or \Yaited until the alleged difficulty was ironed out, but instead he elected to keep the
automobile and to bind hin1self for the payment of the
amount of the note irrespectiYe of any possible dispute
ovc•r \vha t portion of the amount of the check \Yas due and
pa~ra.ble to the Respondent.
Sc_letious 19 and 20, 12 1\.m. J ur., Contracts, p. 515
on the question of "meeting of the minds," or mutual
HNSPUt, reads as fo}lO\YR:

6
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'' 19. Generally. Although it is frequently said
that there must be mutual assent or a meeting of
the minds, it seems that ordinarily no more is
meant than that an expression of mutual assent is
necessary to form a contract. It is sometimes said
that mutual assent is conclusively presumed from
an expression of mutual assent. It is also sometimes said that although mlitual assent is necessary, in certain cases the parties are estopped to
deny that their words or acts accurately express
their actual intent. It seems preferable, however,
to state than an expression of mutual assent is necessary and is ordinarily alone sufficient, anything
further being ordinarily unneceessary to form a
contract. The entry of the parties into a contractual relationship must be manifested by some
intelligible conduct, act or sign. The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from their
outward expressions and acts, and not from an
unexpressed intention. It is said that the meeting
of minds, which is essential to the formation of a
contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed intentions, which may be wholly at variance with the
former. The question whether a contract has been
made must be determined from a consideration of
the expressed intention of the parties - that is,
from a consideration of their words and acts. In
some jurisdictions it is provided by statute that a
voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations
arising from it so far as the facts are known or
ought to be known to the person accepting.
The expression of intention must be promissory and contractual in its nature. Therefore, a
transaction does not constitute a contract if it is
entered into by way of frolic and banter.
7
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20. Binding Effect of Words and Acts. One
who offers or accepts a contract of a certain character is bound by its terms as properly interpreted,
even though he meant something different and
thought the words conveyed his meaning It has
been said that the court must give effect to the
meaning and intention of the parties as expressed
in the language of their contract, in the absence of
anything to show legal impediment to pevent their
entering into any contract they see fit or their expressing it in the language of their own choice.
Accordingly, one who accepts a written obligation
is conclusively bound by its terms. Parties who
have reduced their agreement to writing in plain,
unequivocal terms or in terms susceptible of interpretation and construction under recognized
rules of law are bound by the meaning of the
contract which is reached by a proper interpretation .... ''
Be that as it may, the question of the alleged lack of
meeting of the minds is not in issue in this case, since it
was not raised in the pleadings. The only defenses alleged in the Answer were that the note and contract sued
upon were never executed, the Defendant allegedly having
only signed some other instrument in blank; that the consideration failed ''hen the car ''as voluntarily returned
by Defendant to Plaintiff; and that Plaintiff agreed to cancel the contract. All these alleged defenses are dealt with
elsewhere in this brief; but with regard to cancellation, it
seems that an allegation of c.ancellation admits and presupposes n completed contract, thus refuting the first
alleged defense. The simple fac.t remains that a clear,
complete and unambiguous note and contract were executed by Appellant, and as consideration therefor he had
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and retained possession of a nearly new 1955 Ford automobile and continued to hold possession of said automobile, driving it some 1,800 miles before it was repossessed
(R., p. 40 and p. 56) and even attempting to sell the automobile (R., p. 64), clearly evidencing an understanding on
his part that he was obligated for the purchase price of
the automobile.
PorNT

III.

THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY REGARDING THE
FOLL.OWING:
(a) THE ACTUAL EXECUTIO·N AND CON-

SUMMATIO,N
CONTRACT.

OF THE

NOTE· AND

(b) THE QUESTION OF FAILURE O,F CONSIDERATION.

There could be no question to be presented to the jury
as to the execution of the contract by Defendant being
conditional upon the return of the check, or any part
thereof, since Defendant had already made it impossible
for the check to be paid, so that there was nothing to be
paid to Defendant by Plaintiff under any circumstances,
even under the interpretation most favorable to the Defendant. The only possible question was as to how much
of the $200.00 was owing to Plaintiff, since Defendant admitted several times during his testimony that the price
of the automobile was to be not less than $1,700.00, plus
license and taxes. (R., p. 71 and p. 84) The Defendant
even offered to pay $100.00 of the $200.00. (R., p. 106)
9
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This issue was properly submitted to the jury and resolved in favor of Plaintiff.
The Court did not err in failing to present to the jury
the issue as to the execution and consummation of the
note and contract since the Defendant admitted the execution of the instruments, R., p. 102) receipt of consideration, (R., p. 71) and his intent to be bound by the contract,
(R., p. 70) and did not introduce any evidence to the contrary. Thus the Court, upon considering the evidence,
properly determined that there was no issue to be presented to the jury on this point.
The Court did not err in failing to present to the jury
the question of failure of consideration due to the automobile having been returned to Plaintiff, since the Answer
of the Defendant did not allege failure of consideration
due to the return of the automobile but only due to the
alleged agreement of the Plaintiff to cancel the contract.
Furthermore, the evidence clearly showed that the car
was not voluntarily returned but ,,. . as repossessed after
default. (R., p. 55) As to cancellation, Defendant admitted in his testimony (R., p. 102) that Plaintiff never
agreed to cancel the note or contract and ne\er notified
Defendant or advised him that it would cancel said
instruments.
It may be that counsel for Appellant has confused
the facts of this case \Yith the rule that " . .here a promissory note is giYen as paynze1d of property under the conditional sale contract and the property is returned and
accepted, the consideration fails. Ho,,. .ever, the first provision 011 the reYerse side of the ('iouditional Sale Contract
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(Ex. 3) provides, "The delivery of the promissory note
by the purchaser to the Seller or negotiation of sale
thereof by the Seller shall not be deemed payment of the
purchase price.'' Therefore, the rule referred to does not
apply in this case on account of the repossession of the
automobile. Appellant has not pleaded any other basis
upon which a failure of consideration could be construed
and therefore there was no issue concerning this point to
be presented to the jury.
PoiNT

IV.

IF THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE. JURY AFTER ARGUMENT OF C'OUNSEL,
SUCH ERR.OR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED BY STIPULATION AND ACQUIESC'ENCE OF DEFENDANT
AND COUNSEL.

Appellant claims that the Court erred in instructing
the jury after argument of counsel and allowing the attorney for the Plaintiff to discuss the instructions in front of
the jury, which Appellant claims granted them in effect
a contradictory instruction. It is somewhat understandable that Mr. Bettilyon's thinking on this point might be
less than clear since he was not the attorney who handled the case at the trial and was not present at the trial.
However, the record discloses, in part, that Defendant's
counsel, Mr. Barclay, in the presence of the Defendant,
stipulated and agreed to the correction of the previously
erroneous instruction, and even where the transcript
does not show his express stipulation, his mere acquiescence and failure to object would serve as a waiver of
any such alleged error. Further, the final instruction

11
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given to the jurors with respect to the special interrogatory conce.rning the $200.00 check was clear and would
serve to clarify and resolve any confusion in the mind
of any person of ordinary intelligence, in addition to
which the written form of the special interrogatory was
especially clear and unambiguous and clearly stated the
correct issue, as admitted by Mr. Barclay on Page 100 of
the Transcript. (R., p. 122) If there was any error in the
Court's action it was not prejudicial to Defendant, even
had it not been waived by acquiescence and stipulation.
PoiNT

V.

THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ADMIT
EXHIBITS 8 AND 9 WAS NOT IN ERROR AND
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

Appellant contends that the Court erred in failing to
allow Defendant to introduce Exhibits 8 and 9. Exhibit 8,
it is submitted, is immaterial, being only a demand directed by Plaintiff's attorney to Defendant for payment
of the $200.00 check on account of its having been returned by the bank for insufficient funds. Exhibit 9 was
properly excluded because in part it contained a selfserving statement by which Defendant, by the extrinsic
evidence would endeavor to Yary the terms of the written
contract. However, Defendant was not prejudiced by its
exclusion as an exhibit, since it contains damaging admissions by Defendant as to Defendant's liability on the
$200.00 check in addition to the contract bal'3.nce. Also,
the record will show that part of the import of the letter
was introduced b~T Defendant's testimony on cross-examination and by representations of Defendant's counsel.
12
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PoiNT

VI.

THE COURT PROPERLY R.EFUS.ED TO GRANT
DE.FENDANT''S MOTIO·N TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE· TO STATE A CAUSE OF
ACTIO·N.

With respect to Appellant's allegation that the Court
erred in refusing to grant Defendant's l\!Iotion to Dismiss
on the grounds that the Complaint failed to state a claim
against Defendant upon which relief could be granted, Respondent submits this question to the Court, since it is
clear that the Complaint clearly stated a claim against the
Defendant upon which relief could be granted, and no
evidence or argument was offered by Defendant on this
question.
Appellant in his Brief on Page 19, Paragraph 5, contends that since there was a $10.00 discrepancy between
the testimony of Mr. Hunsaker concerning the proceeds
of the sale of the automobile at auction and the figure
specified in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories, this
question should have been submitted to the jury, and that
the Court erred in using the figures of the Plaintiff. However, a recomputation of the figures will show that the
credit of $1,080.00 was allowed, rather than the smaller
credit of $1,070.00, which gave the Defendant the benefit
of the $10.00 discrepancy, and was certainly not prejudicial. Also, it should be noted that Defendant's attorney,
Mr. Barclay, (R. p. 104) stipulated as to the propriety
of the credit allowed, as reflected in Plaintiff's Complaint,
and no issue was ever raised by Defendant as to the
amount of the resale price of the car at the auction.
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Hence, there was no issue in this regard to be presented
to the jury. It should be noted that Mr. Bettilyon, on Page
13 of Appellant's Brief, infers that this Stipulation by Mr.
Barclay was based on a misunderstanding on Mr. Barclay's part as to whether the Court had reference to the
original sale price of the automobile when sold to Defendant or to the resale of the automobile at the auction. However, a further examination of the record at that point
will reveal that the Court made it completely clear and
understandable as to which sale :figure was meant.
In addition to all the foregoing, it should be noted
that not only did testimony of the Defendant on cross-examination fail to support the allegations contained in his
Answer; hut also, the Defendant actually failed to put on
any evidence at all, having rested at the end of Plaintiff's
case in chief. The Defendant and Appellant clearly failed
to sustain the burden of his defense.

CONCLUSION
In view of all the foregoing, the judgment in favor of
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant should be affirmed
in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
CHAS. E. BRADFORD and
C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
65 East 4th South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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